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Note
The ERISA Amendment: A Prescription to Sue MCOs
for Wrongful Treatment Decisions
Julie K Locke*
Rarely does one turn on the television or open a newspaper
without encountering horror stories of patients suffering or
dying because their health maintenance organizations
(HIIOs)' denied them necessary medical procedures or restricted their ability to receive treatment. 2 Increasingly, the
managed care industry is under attack because of these reports,3 which have increased as patients who have been denied
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; BA 1997,
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN. The author would like to thank Professor Susan M. Wolf, Gretchen Forney, and Mark Weidemaier for their helpful suggestions. The author would also like to thank John and Kristine Locke
for their support and encouragement.
1. HMOs are associations that provide health care services for their
members by contracting with health care providers and covering the medical
costs of the treatment. See Gordon L MacLeod, An Overview of Managed

Health Care, in

THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK

3, 4-5 (Peter R.

Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993). Typically, patients who subscribe or enroll in an
HIMO plan pay a fixed annual premium. See Allison Faber Walsh, The Legal
Attack on Cost ContainmentMechanisms: The Expansionof Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 207
n.2 (1997). The HMO then covers a predetermined list of health services, including required medical services, hospitalization, and emergency care, and
limits patients to seeking treatment from a list of approved providers. See id.
2. Horror stories of patients denied medical treatment are abundant.
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Family Who Sued H.M.O., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at Al (describing the story of a California woman who
died of breast cancer after her HMO refused to cover a bone marrow transplant); Larry Keller & Fred Schulte, GrievanceSystem Criticized, SUN-SENT.
(Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 10, 1993, at 1A (recounting the experience of a Florida
man who died of a heart attack in his daughter's car outside an HMO clinic
after the HMO refused to hospitalize him); Treatment Trouble, SUN-SENT. (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 7, 1993, at 25A (depicting one patient's agony after his
HMO refused to provide a drug needed to manage his prostrate cancer, insisting that he undergo surgery to remove his testicles because this was a
more cost effective procedure).
3. See Marsha Austin, HMO Pioneer a Survivor, DENV. BUS. J., Sept. 4,
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proper care sue their managed care organizations (MCOs) 4 and
the physicians affiliated with them.5 Most of these lawsuits
fail, however, because the plaintiffs obtain their health insurance from employee benefit plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).6 When a patient brings
a state law claim 7 against the MCO, the case is often removed
to federal court and subsequently dismissed because federal
courts hold that ERISA preempts direct claims against an

1998, at 1A (describing the current decade as "an age when for-profit HMOs
are under attack for sacrificing patients to the almighty dollar"); see also Horror Stories Propel Debate over HMO Bills, FLA. TODAY, Aug. 21, 1998, at 7A
(discussing one patient who told her story in thousands of newspapers, on
"Good Morning America," and in letters to 1,000 federal and state legislators
and reporters after her HMO would not pay for rehabilitation to help her walk
and speak again); Maggie Mahar, Time for a Checkup, BARRON'S, Mar. 4,
1996, at 29, 30 ("[N]ewspapers and magazines have turned from cheerful if
boring tales of HMOs' ability to contain costs to horror stories about patients
who requested a particular procedure, were turned down by HMO administrators, and subsequently died.").
4. "Managed care organization" is a comprehensive label that describes a
variety of health insurance systems that provide health care at a reduced cost
by using methods like reduced-price purchasing agreements with health care
providers and pre-authorization requirements for facility admissions or surgical procedures. See Jeffrey O'Connell & James F. Neale, HMO's, Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New MalpracticeThreats and a ProposedReform,
14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLVY 287, 288 n.8 (1998). MCOs encompass a
number of entities, including HMOs and preferred provider organizations
(PPOs). See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizationsand PatientInjury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REV. 419,431 (1997). For a description of
HMOs, see supra note 1. PPOs are panels of physicians that contract with
insurers to provide medical services for insureds at reduced rates. See Jack
IK Kilcullen, Gropingfor the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice,and Enterprise
Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7,25-26 (1996).
5. See Edward Felsenthal, When HMOs Say No to Health Coverage,
More PatientsAre Taking Them to Court, WALL ST. J., May 17, 1996, at B1
(stating that people are increasingly willing to sue their HMOs when they receive what they consider inadequate care and that "some patients are going
straight to a lawyer as soon as coverage for routine care is denied").
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
7. State law causes of action brought against MCOs generally include
direct liability claims for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and breach of
contract. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, 48 F.3d 937, 939 (6th Cir.
1995) (involving claims of wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical malpractice, and insurance bad faith against employee benefit
plan); Kuhl v. Lincoln Natl Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993)
(suing health plan for medical malpractice, emotional distress, tortious interference with right to contract for medical care, and breach of contract as a
third party beneficiary); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, 965 F.2d 1321, 1324
(5th Cir. 1992) (asserting medical malpractice and wrongful death claims
against health plan).
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MCO that relate to employment benefits.8 Although Congress
enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect employees from employer
mismanagement of benefit plans, the practical effect of this
legislation has been to disadvantage employees by protecting
MCOs from direct liability. 9
As a result, the federal judiciary, state governments, and
Congress have recognized the need for health care reform to
provide patients with an effective form of redress against
MCOs when they have been wrongly denied treatment. 10 Federal courts have altered ERISA's effect on patient claims by
finding that ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations on MCOs, including HMOs and PPOs,II and that patients may sue their
MCOs for breach of these obligations.1 2 Although these decisions demonstrate that MCOs may be liable under ERISA,
ERISA protects MCOs from the harsh damages, including
compensatory and punitive damages, available under state
causes of action. 13 State legislatures have addressed ERISA
preemption by passing laws attempting to regulate managed

8. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing that the Act "shall supercede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"). For further discussion of ERISA preemption, see infra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of patients' direct liability claims against MCOs for negligent provision of care.
10. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 61 (D.
Mass. 1997) (noting that ERISA preemption has led Congress, the states, and
the health care industry to recognize the need for reform); Kent G. Rutter,
Democratizing HMO Regulation to Enforce the Rule of Rescue, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 147, 149 (1996) (describing extensive efforts to regulate HMOs at
state and federal levels of government as public confidence in HMO care has
been badly shaken).
11. For a discussion of managed care entities, including HMOs and PPOs,
see supra note 4.
12. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 373 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that HMOs' financial incentive schemes may constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty where plan doctors and administrators delay or withhold necessary
treatment or proper care for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses);
Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
297 (1997) (ruling that the fiduciary obligations imposed by ERISA require
HMOs to disclose the financial incentives imposed on physicians that affect
their medical decisionmaking); Ries v. Humana Health Plan, No. 94-C-6180,
1995 WL 669583, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995) (holding that a health plan insurer breaches its fiduciary obligations under ERISA when it collects more
from insureds than it pays out on their claims under an undisclosed discounting agreement with health care providers).
13. Compensatory and punitive damages are not available under ERISA.
See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-62 (1993).
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care. 14 Although MCOs contend that ERISA's preemption
clause invalidates these laws, a recent decision from a Texas
federal court demonstrates that state laws regulating managed
care may withstand the ERISA challenge. 5
Like many state governments, Congress has debated legislation that would permit patients to sue MCOs for unreasonable treatment decisions.16 Congress recently considered the
Patients' Bill of Rights, which placed restraints on MCOs, provided patients with a "bill of rights," and extended to MCO participants the power to sue their health plans for damages on an
individual basis.17 The legislation was fiercely debated among
Democrat and Republican members of Congress whose distinct
versions of the bill indicate substantial differences of opinion
on many significant health care reform issues. 18 On October 7,
1998, President Clinton and Democratic leaders made it official
that the Patients' Bill of Rights legislation was dead for the
year. 19 However, the lack of action in 1998 does not mean the
death of the managed care reform issue; political candidates
are already using health care reform in their campaign ads,
and members of Congress expect health care reform proposals
to be back this year.20
This Note proposes that Congress amend ERISA to provide patients with the right to sue an MCO in federal court for
damages when the patient believes the MCO unreasonably re14. Approximately 1,000 bills regulating managed care have been introduced by state legislatures, 182 of which have already been enacted into law.
See Milt Freudenheim, PioneeringState for Managed Care Considers Change,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at Al; see also infra Part I.B (discussing state
legislative proposals to hold HMOs accountable for negligent patient care).
15. See Corporate Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597,
630 (S.D. Tex. 1998). For a discussion of the decision, see infra notes 87-90
and accompanying text.
16. An unreasonable treatment decision may include refusing to pay for
desired medical services, restricting treatment options, or both.
17. See Laura M. Litvan, Has Managed Care Hurt Quality?, INVESTOR'S
Bus. DAILY, May 1, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 11850291 (discussing
the Patients' Bill of Rights legislation debated by Congress throughout the
1998 legislative session).
18. See S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998)
(Democrats' Patients' Bill of Rights legislation); S. 2330, 105th Cong. (1998);
H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998) (Republicans' Patients' Bill of Rights legislation); see also infra Part II.C (discussing the proposals).
19. See Clinton, Democrats Say PatientBill Is Dead, Blame Republicans
for Defeat, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d5 (Oct. 8, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-HCD File.
20. See id.
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fused to cover desired medical treatment. Part I examines the
inadequate care received by patients enrolled in MCOs and explores how ERISA preemption has made it impossible for patients to sue MCOs when they have been victims of such abuse.
Part II discusses attempts by courts, state governments, and
Congress to circumvent ERISA preemption, including the recently rejected Patients' Bill of Rights. Part III argues that
amending ERISA to permit patients to sue MCOs for making
negligent health care coverage decisions is a much more effective means of protecting patients. Part IV asserts that Congress must limit this right to sue, however, by incorporating an
appeals process into the ERISA amendment to ensure that patients bringing suit were unreasonably denied health care coverage and that their MCOs were responsible for the resulting
consequences. This process offers the most effective means to
protect patients, returns physicians to the practice of medicine,
and maintains the cost-cutting purpose of managed care.
I. THE MANAGED CARE INDUSTRY UNDER ATTACK
A. THE RISE OF MANAGED CARE AND THE INCREASED RISK OF
PATIENT ABUSE

As health insurance premiums reached astronomical levels
in the 1980s, 21 numerous employers eliminated the old fee-forservice form22 of health care coverage and began offering em21. By the end of the 1980s, national medical spending totaled $604 billion, which was nearly 12% of the gross national product. See GEORGE
ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL
TRUST 22 (1996).
22. Until recently, the fee-for-service system was the primary method of
insurance reimbursement for physician medical care. See Ryan Steven Johnson, Note, ERISA Doctor in the House? The Duty to Disclose PhysicianIncentives to Limit Health Care, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (1998). Under this
system, patients usually purchased health insurance through their employers.
See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians,22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400 (1996). Each time they visited their
physician, the insurance plan reimbursed the physician according to the
services the physician rendered. See id. This practice encouraged physicians
to render as many services as possible, since the number of services provided
for each patient directly related to the amount the physicians were paid. See
id. It also gave patients unlimited choice over which doctor they would see.
See Johnson, supra, at 1635. As a result of these patient and physician freedoms, employers bore severe financial burdens and sought a new approach to
medical care. See ANDERS, supra note 21, at 16-17 (discussing one company
whose expenses for employee health care climbed to 39% of all corporate expenses for one year).
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ployees insurance through managed care plans.23 MCOs reduce insurance premiums through various cost containment
mechanisms such as capitation 24 and risk-sharing arrangements, 25 which encourage physicians to minimize their use of
medical services. MCOs also attempt to keep costs down by
subjecting physicians to "gag clauses," which prohibit physicians from discussing treatment options with patients until after they receive authorization from the plan.26 Despite the possible financial rewards of cost-cutting mechanisms and clauses,
they risk inhibiting physician-patient communication 27 and
may diminish the quality of care that patients receive. 28
23. See ANDERS, supra note 21, at 17.
24. Capitation means that managed care organizations pay physicians or
their practice groups a set dollar payment per patient per unit of time
(usually per month) to cover a specified set of services and administrative
costs for that patient. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(c) (1997). This payment remains constant regardless of the expense and number of services provided.
See id.
25. A risk-sharing program allows MCOs to withhold a percentage of the
physician's monthly capitation payment, pool it with that of other providers,
and use it to pay for specialist referrals, lengthy hospital stays, expensive
medical tests or procedures, and other services exceeding budget expectations.
See Bethany J. Spielman, After the GagEpisode: Physician Communication in
Managed Care Organizations, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 437, 444 (1998). If
the physician keeps expenditures low enough, she will receive a portion of the
money pooled. See id. at 444-45. However, if the fimds have been depleted
due to an excessive number of services, the physicians in the program share
the loss. See Walsh, supra note 1, at 219.
26. See Spielman, supra note 25, at 441-43.
27. See generally id. (discussing current communication conflicts between
physicians, patients, and MCOs). Physicians signing contracts that limit their
ability to disclose treatment options to patients are under a great deal of pressure to comply with conflicting duties. On the one hand, they are legally and
ethically bound to disclose treatment alternatives to satisfy their duty to obtain patients' informed consent. See id. at 441-42. On the other hand, they
are contractually prohibited from disclosing the same treatment alternatives
to MCO patients. See id. An increasing number of physicians have left the
medical profession due to these conflicting duties and their disgust with administrators who have limited medical knowledge forcing them to limit patient care in order to increase the salaries of insurance company executives
and HMO organizations. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 376 (7th Cir.
1998).
28. See, e.g., Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical
Implications of Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433,
439 (1996) (arguing that patient care has suffered because HMO policies create a conflict of interest between a physician's economic incentives and her
interest in caring for her patients); Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon,
Physician-AssistedSuicide: The Lethal Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit
Decisions, 85 CAL. L. REv. 371, 424 (1997) (discussing studies showing substantially reduced patient satisfaction with care in HMOs as compared to fee-
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As enrollment in MCOs continues to grow at an explosive
rate,29 the greatest fear is that health plans will deny their patients diagnostic procedures, multiple treatment options, and
expensive referrals in order to ensure their own economic
gain. 30 This fear is a reality for those patients who have been
denied lifesaving treatment.3 1 In some cases, the MCO determined the desired treatment to be experimental, investiga32
tional, or not medically necessary, and thus refused to pay.
for-service programs); Debra S. Wood, Risky Business: Lending to Health
Maintenance Organizationsand Physician PracticeManagement Companies,
1 N.C. BANKING INST. 322, 350 (1997) (stating that HMOs' cost efficient
strategies are perceived by many to result in reduced quality health care
services for HMO patients).
Whether MCOs provide lower quality care than the fee-for-service system
is a topic of much debate. Some critics assert that patients enrolled in HIOs
and other managed care entities receive care of the same or better quality
than patients enrolled in fee-for-service plans. See Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Medical Advocates: A Call for a New Profession, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 299,
301 (1996). In reaching this conclusion, these commentators have focused on
HMO enrollees who have received more preventive care than enrollees in traditional health insurance plans. See id.; see also Philip R. Alper, Learningto
Accentuate the Positive in Managed Care, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 508, 508-09
(1997). For populations requiring more than preventive care, the benefits of
managed care do not clearly outweigh the risks. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the ManagedCare Revolution: PrivateAccreditation and a New System
Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REV. 361, 377-85 (1998). Furrow examines studies conducted to determine whether elderly, child, and cancer patients enrolled in
HMOs had worse quality of care outcomes than their fee-for-service counterparts, and finds that the evidence is inconclusive. See id.
29. According to a 1997 KPMG survey, 33% of employees working for employers with more than 200 workers were enrolled in HMOs, up from 22% in
1992, and 31% of such employees were enrolled in PPOs, up from 26% in 1992.
By contrast, 18% of such employees were enrolled in fee-for-service plans. By
the end of 1996, the total number of HMO members grew to 67.5 million
Americans, an 85% increase since 1990. See American Association of Health
Plans, Managed Care Facts (visited Jan. 4, 1999) <http:/www.aahp.org/menus/index.cfln>. The total number of PPO members grew to 97.8 million people, an enrollment increase of 154% since 1990. See id.
30. See AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in
Managed Care, 2733 JAMA 330, 333 (1995).
31. See supra note 2 (describing patients who suffered serious illnesses,
extreme pain, or death after their MCOs denied coverage for their medical
treatment).
32. See Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit of Health: With More Patients Suing HMOs for Denial of Treatment Lawyers Are ExploringNew Ground in Going up Against the Managed-Care Giants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 55, 58.
Critics of managed care argue that using words like "experimental,"
"investigational," and "medically necessary" to label possible treatment procedures allows HMOs to ration care without saying so. See id. HMOs use these
broad terms to provide a label for anything they do not want to pay for because they do not want to list specific treatment methods that are excluded by
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In other cases, the MCO denied treatment after failing to
evaluate adequately the severity of the patient's condition. 33
As a result, the tension between patients, doctors, and managed care entities has increased, reducing public trust in the
health care industry and sparking increased litigation. 34
If a patient is injured because her MCO refused to cover
medical treatment, the patient may attempt to recover her
losses by suing the MCO under state common law theories of
liability.35 Although physicians have been the traditional targets of medical malpractice claims brought by patients denied
sufficient care, MCOs are increasingly named in patient lawsuits. 36 Claims asserting MCO liability for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and breach of contract fall into two main
categories: vicarious liability and direct liability.37 Managed
care entities may be vicariously liable for the negligence of
their plan physicians and administrators under theories such
as respondeat superior 3s and ostensible agency.39 As MCOs astheir plans. See id.
33. See id. at 58.
34. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (describing the public's
negative perception of managed care and people's increasing willingness to
sue MCOs that have denied coverage).
35. See supra note 7 (noting that the state law causes of action generally
brought against negligent MCOs are direct liability claims for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and breach of contract).
36. See John R. Penhallegon, Emerging Physician and OrganizationLiabilities Under Managed Health Care, 64 DEF. COUNs. J. 347, 352 (1997).
MCOs are attractive defendants because they have deeper pockets than the
average physician and because juries are not particularly sympathetic to the
managed care industry. See id. at 352-53.
37. See Angela M. Easley, Comment, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA
Preemptionof HMO Medical MalpracticeClaims: The DissatisfactoryDistinction Between Quality and Quantity of Care, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 293, 304
(1998).
38. To prevail under a respondeat superior theory, a plaintiff must prove
that her physician acted negligently in treating her, that an employeremployee relationship existed between the HMO and the physician, and that
the physician's tortious behavior fell within the scope of his employment. See
William A. Chittenden I, MalpracticeLiability and Managed Health Care:
History & Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 453-54 (1991) (referring to W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed.
1984) and RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)). Plaintiffs typically do not prevail under this theory, however, because in a majority of
MCOs physicians are not employees of the MCO but are independent contractors. See Penhallegon, supra note 36, at 353.
39. The doctrine of ostensible agency provides that "where an organization represents that a physician is its agent or employee, and causes a patient
to rely on that representation in submitting to care, the organization will be
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sert greater control over the manner in which physicians deliver care, courts may hold them directly liable for negligent
credentialing of plan physicians 4° or for negligent decisions
42
made through utilization review41 and peer review procevicariously liable for the torts of the purported agent, irrespective of the fact
that the relationship was actually that of an independent contractor." Penhallegon, supra note 36, at 353 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 267 (1958)). When determining whether the patient looks to the
organization for care, courts consider factors including the degree of control
the plan exerts over physician selection, and whether the physician's malpractice arose out of the "performance of an inherent function" of the plan. See
Chittenden, supra note 38, at 459. In determining whether the organization
represented the physician as its employee, courts look to the representations
made by the organization to the patient. See id.
40. The doctrine of negligent credentialing is a theory of institutional liability that places a duty on MCOs to select and retain only competent physicians. See Penhallegon, supra note 36, at 355. The elements for a cause of
action for negligent selection, retention, or evaluation of a physician are: (1)
the MCO rendered services to the plaintiff subscriber; (2) the MCO should
have recognized the services as necessary for the protection of its subscriber;
(3) the MCO failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and/or
evaluating the plaintiff's primary care physician; and (4) as a result of the
MCO's failure to use such reasonable care, the risk of harm to the subscriber
was increased. See id.
41. MCOs often operate utilization review processes that evaluate medical services before permitting physicians to administer them. See Easley, supra note 37, at 305. This allows MCOs to ascertain whether less costly treatments and tests are available. See id. A review agent, who is usually not a
physician, applies a predetermined set of criteria established by the managed
care plan to a patient's medical situation as presented by the attending physician. See J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine?,
19 J. LEGAL MED. 431, 433 (1998). If the treatment given or proposed by the
physician meets the criteria, the review agent will approve insurance coverage. See id. If the criteria are not met, the matter is referred to an administrator, who consults with the attending physician about the particular facts of
the case. See id. The administrator determines whether the desired treatment meets plan specifications, and ultimately approves or denies coverage.
See id. In some plans, the administrators making the final coverage determination are non-physicians; however, in a majority of cases, they are physicians. See id. at 433-34. Liability arising from cost containment systems is
imposed where a utilization review administrator deliberately overrides a
physician's request for certain tests or treatments in order to lower costs. See
id. at 435-38.
42. Peer review is the process by which a special committee of medical
peers reviews an individual physician's credentials, including medical education, residency training, board certification, and the number of procedures the
physician has performed, and determines whether the physician should be
granted staff privileges. See Judith E. Orie, Economic Credentialing:BottomLine Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 437, 446 (1998). The more training, expertise, and proven ability a physician has, the more privileges he may be
granted. See id. Peer review decisions have commonly been designed to ensure quality medical care for hospital patients. See id. at 447. In today's
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dures. Although these causes of action appear to be attractive
means for targeting negligent MCOs, patients asserting direct
and vicarious liability claims against MCOs have had little
success because of the preemptive effect of ERISA.43
B. ERISA HAMPERS PATIENT CLAIMS AGAINST HMOs
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA44 to eliminate abuses occurring in employee pension plans.45 Congress's primary purpose in enacting ERISA was to protect participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries by requiring
disclosure of financial and other pertinent information.46 In
particular, Congress intended ERISA to address inadequate
funding of employee benefit plans and the resulting hardship
to employees who had relied on anticipated benefits.47
In addition, Congress enacted ERISA to protect employers
from conflicting state regulation of employee benefit plans.48
Congress accomplished this goal through ERISA's preemption
clause,49 which has insulated MCOs, the entities responsible
for administering employee benefit plans, from being held accountable under state malpractice, wrongful death, and breach
of contract claims as well as claims brought under state laws
regulating health care. 50 The clause has also made it virtually
managed care world, however, hospitals and IMOs are expanding the peer
review process beyond traditional quality of care criteria to include financial
and economic factors. See id. at 452. Therefore, the process has become more
of a cost containment mechanism through which a hospital or H1MO may exclude a physician "for treating too many poor people, having too many acutely
ill patients, or simply for providing thorough and effective medical care." Id.
43. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
which courts have held that ERISA preempted state law claims brought
by
patients against allegedly negligent HMOs).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 3-4 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001. At the time of its enactment, one legislator heralded ERISA as "nothing less than a pension 'bill of
rights' to which every worker-regardless of his [or her] occupation, salary
or
status-is entitled." Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the
Health Care Industry: An Abdication of JudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46
FLA. L. REV. 355, 359 (1994) (quoting statement of Senator Javits).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
47. See id. § 1001(a).
48. See Jack E. Morris, Comment, Small Employers and Group Health
Insurance:Should ERISA Apply?, 52 LA. L. REV. 971, 977 (1992).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); see also supra note 8 (quoting the language of
ERISA's preemption clause).
50. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing cases in
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impossible for a patient to prevail against her MOO on any
51
claim brought under state law.
In spite of ERISA preemption, patients have had some
success bringing vicarious liability claims against MCOs. The
more control a managed care entity exerts over the provision of
care, the greater the probability the entity will be vicariously
52
liable for the torts of its independent contractor physicians. A
number of federal and state courts have held that patients who
have been injured by negligent treatment decisions made by a
health care provider acting as an agent of an MCO may pursue
53
vicarious liability claims against the MCO. In reaching this
which ERISA preemption shielded HlIOs from liability under state law).
Congress expressly exempted state laws governing insurance from the scope
of ERISA's preemption clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). However, this
does not aid patients enrolled in employee benefit plans because the statute
also provides that no state insurance law shall deem a self-insured pension or
benefits plan an "insurance company or other insurer." Id. ERISA defines
self-funded health care plans as those established or maintained by an employer through the purchase of insurance to provide medical, surgical, or hospital benefits for employees and their beneficiaries. See id. § 1002(1)(A). As a
result of these provisions, when an injured patient sues an MCO engaged by
an employer to administer the employer's self-funded health care plan, the
MCO asserts ERISA preemption as a defense to avoid liability for the patient's injuries.
51. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 39 (discussing the doctrine of ostensible agency, which
subjects HMOs to vicarious liability for the negligent acts of independent contractor physicians).
53. See, e.g., Pacificare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a claim of vicarious liability for
malpractice against a managed care organization); Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare,
57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that ERISA did not preempt plaintiffs
vicarious liability malpractice claim against U.S. HealthCare). In Pacificare,
the court held that the plaintiffs vicarious liability claim was not preempted
by ERISA because it did not sufficiently relate to an ERISA plan; therefore,
the court remanded the claim to state court for resolution. 59 F.3d at 155.
The court reasoned that vicarious liability claims against HlIOs for the malpractice of their physicians are attacks on the quality of care, not the administration of benefits. See id. at 154. Therefore, the court reasoned, it is not
necessary to reference a benefit plan to determine the issue of a physician's
negligence in treating a patient. See i& Moreover, the court reasoned, an
agency arrangement between an HMO and the physician is too tenuous a relationship to the plan to warrant preemption. See i&L In Dukes, the court
found that the plaintiff was not asserting a claim that the HMO withheld
benefits due under the plan, but was complaining about the low quality of the
benefit actually received. 57 F.3d at 356-57. Although the ERISA statute
provides a remedy for benefits not received, the court noted that it does not
refer to the quality of benefit received. See id. at 357. Therefore, the court
held that ERISA did not preempt the plaintiffs state law claim against U.S.
HealthCare. See id at 356.
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conclusion, courts emphasize that ERISA was not intended to
bar injured patients from seeking state law remedies against
managed care organizations that have negligently controlled or
arranged for their medical treatment.5 4 Although these decisions demonstrate that state health care regulation in the vicarious liability context may be preserved despite ERISA preemption, "[t]he rulings are not without loopholes."s5
Furthermore, several federal courts have ruled that all vicarious liability claims are preempted, 6 demonstrating the many
roadblocks ERISA preemption presents for patient lawsuits57
Patients have had even less success holding their MCOs
directly liable.5 8 MCOs have consistently escaped liability by
persuading courts that ERISA preempts medical malpractice
and other state tort actions brought directly against the MCO
because the claims result from the denial or improper processing of benefits, and not from the quality of medical advice.59

54. See Easley, supra note 37, at 309.
55. Id- at 312. For example, HMOs have argued that one of the contractual benefits of being enrolled in an HMO is an implied promise that HMO
physicians and services will be of acceptable quality. Therefore, a claim that
the physician's care or the services provided were not of acceptable quality
could essentially be a claim that benefits were denied, thus subjecting the
claim to ERISA preemption. See id.
56. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., 868 F. Supp. 110,
113 (D. Md. 1994) (holding that any medical malpractice claim against an
HMO, whether expressed in direct or vicarious liability terms, relates to the
benefit plan and thus is preempted by ERISA); Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp.
125, 130 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that state law claims against an HMO premised on vicarious liability are preempted by ERISA); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840
F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that state tort claims arising under a
theory of vicarious liability are preempted by ERISA).
57. See Easley, supra note 37, at 314.
58. See e.g., Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir.
1996); Tolton v. American Biodyne, 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Spain v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129 (9th Cir. 1993); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan,
999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, 965 F.2d 1321
(5th Cir. 1992).
59. See, e.g., Tolton, 48 F.3d at 942 (finding that Mr. Tolton's family's
wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical malpractice,
and insurance bad faith claims were preempted by ERISA because they resulted from benefit determinations made by his health plan); Kuhl, 999 F.2d
at 302-03 (ruling that Mr. Kuhl's family's claim that his health plan negligently delayed his heart surgery was essentially a claim that the plan denied
him benefits or improperly processed his benefits under the plan, which is exactly the type of claim that ERISA preempts); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331
(finding that health plan's decision not to hospitalize a woman in a high-risk
pregnancy involved a benefit determination and thus was preempted by
ERISA).
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These claims thus "relate to" the administration of benefits
under the patient's health care plan and fall within the scope
of ERISA preemption. 6°
Granted, federal preemption does not end the patient's
case; it simply substitutes a federal forum and remedy for the
preempted state action.61 However, a plaintiff who successfully
demonstrates that her MCO denied her medically necessary
treatment may only recover the amount of benefits that were
denied under the plan. 62 For example, if a patient was denied
a diagnostic procedure such as an ultrasound, she will only be
able to recover the cost of the ultrasound. As a result, the
plaintiff cannot recover for the extensive pain and suffering,
injury, or loss of life which likely motivated her to sue the MCO
in the first place. 63
II. EARLY RESPONSES TO ERISA PREEMPTION
EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR REFORM
The injustice surrounding ERISA preemption has led federal courts, state legislatures, and Congress to propose health
care reform that provides plaintiffs with a means of redress
when they have been injured by their MCOs. Federal courts
worked with the current ERISA statute to accomplish reform,
and state legislatures and Congress introduced new legislation.
They have made some headway toward providing greater pro-

60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
61. See Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and
JudicialOversight of Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 403, 408 (1998).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994) (permitting an employeebeneficiary to bring a civil action "to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan"). ERISA also allows the prevailing plaintiff to collect attorneys' fees. See id. § 1132(g)(1).
63. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that compensatory
and punitive damages are not available under ERISA). Because ERISA preemption only applies to claims against MCOs, patients may still collect compensatory and punitive damages by bringing state medical malpractice claims
against their treating physicians. See Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care
Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1243 (1997). Therefore, many patients
name their individual physicians as defendants in the lawsuit against their
MCOs. Suing one's physician is less appealing than suing one's HMO, however, since most physician malpractice insurance policies have million dollar
caps. This amount is usually not even close to the sum of money that a plaintiff could potentially be awarded by a jury in the typical wrongful death or
catastrophic injury case. See Penhallegon, supra note 36, at 352-53.
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tection for patients, but they have yet to find a uniform means
of eliminating ERISA preemption.
A. FEDERAL COURTS DISRUPT ERISA PREEMPTION
Federal courts were among the first government actors to
attempt to overcome ERISA preemption. As discussed above,
some courts circumvented ERISA preemption in the context of
vicarious liability claims against MCOs.6 4 The United States
Supreme Court addressed ERISA preemption in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plansv. Travelers
Insurance Company.65 Although the Court did not address
ERISA preemption in the context of patient claims against allegedly negligent MCOs, the Court's opinion offers some in-

sight into the inconsistencies between the language and pur-

pose of the statute. Noting that the language of ERISA's
preemption clause was "unhelpful,"66 the Court looked to the
purpose of the statute to determine whether Congress intended
a state law to survive preemption.6 7 Because the goal of

ERISA's preemption clause is to "minimize the administrative

and financial burden[s]" on interstate employee benefit plans, 6 8
a state law will only be preempted if it imposes unacceptable
burdens on a plan, such as mandating benefit structures or

their administration, or providing alternate enforcement
mechanisms.6 9 The disparity between ERISA's text and pur64 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, the Supreme Court reviewed a
New York statute that imposed a surcharge on hospital rates. See id. at 64950. Although the Court recognized that the surcharges would affect the cost
of providing hospital benefits in New York, the Court concluded that this was
an indirect economic effect that did not bind plan administrators to any particular benefits choice. See id. at 659. Therefore, the Court held that the
statute was not preempted by ERISA. See id. at 662.
66. Id. at 656.
67. See id. In adopting this approach, the Court rejected a broad literal
interpretation of the "related to" language of the ERISA preemption clause.
See id at 655-56. The Court also concluded that Congress did not intend for
ERISA to federalize health care costs. See id. at 662 ("[C]ost uniformity
[among States] was almost certainly not an object of pre-emption, just as laws
with only an indirect economic effect on the relative costs of various health
insurance packages in a given State are a far cry from those 'conflicting directives' from which Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans.").
68. Id. at 656.
69. See id. at 657-59, 661 ("While Congress's extension of pre-emption to
all 'state laws relating to benefit plans' was meant to sweep more broadly than
'state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA'... nothing in
the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
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pose uncovered by the Court in Travelers demonstrates the
need for ERISA reform.
Although MCOs continue to persuade federal courts that
ERISA preempts state tort actions challenging the quality of
care delivered by HMOs, a few courts have interpreted ERISA
to provide a more meaningful cause of action for plaintiffs
70
whose claims have been removed to federal court. The Eighth
71
Circuit initiated this effort in Shea v. Esensten by holding
that ERISA imposes a duty on plan physicians and administrators to disclose the existence and nature of financial incentives

chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a
matter of local concern."). In other words, courts should decide whether
ERISA preempts state law "not by asking whether the language requires it or
whether Congress intended it, but by asking whether preemption makes
sense as a matter of ERISA policy." Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About
the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 42 (1996).
Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in Travelers, one commentator
has argued that the main inquiry for preemption of tort claims against HMOs
is to define "plan administration" and determine whether contracts between
an HMO and doctors involve the administration of an ERISA plan. See Ayling, supra note 61, at 415. If the contracts are part of plan administration,
then ERISA preempts state law claims challenging the quality of care resulting from such contracts. See id. If the contracts are not part of plan administration, then the state law claims are not preempted because they do not
"relate to" them within the meaning of the preemption provision. See id.
The Department of Labor has adopted a similar approach, which is demonstrated in its amicus briefs on the ERISA preemption issue. These briefs
are posted on the Department of Labor's internet site. See Health Administration Responsibility Project, The Secretary of Labor's Amicus Briefs on
ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims Against HMOs (visited
Feb. 20, 1998) <http.//www.harp.org/dol.htm>. The Department argues that
an ERISA "benefit" is simply membership in the HMO and an ERISA "plan" is
the terms, conditions, and procedures for instigating that membership. See
Ayling, supra note 61, at 419 (discussing the Department of Labor's argument
in its amicus brief for the appellant in Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir.
1997)). The operation of and quality of care delivered by the HMO may be a
health "plan" in the everyday sense, but not in the ERISA sense. See id.
Therefore, quality of care issues are part of state health insurance and tort
law, and are not preempted by ERISA. See id.
70. See supra note 12 (discussing three federal cases in which courts upheld claims brought by patients against HMOs for breach of fiduciary obligations).
71. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1997). Mr.
Shea, a man with a family history of heart disease and symptoms of heart
problems, died of heart failure after his family doctor led him to believe that
he did not need a referral to a cardiologist. See id. at 626. Unbeknownst to
Mr. Shea, his HIO (Medica) had a contract with his family doctor which included financial incentives to minimize these referrals. See id. at 627.
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used to affect physicians' medical decisionmakingj2 The court
stated that financial incentive schemes between an HMO and a
physician are material facts requiring disclosure because silence about such facts has the potential to harm patients.7 3
Noting that a patient needing specialized care relies on her
doctor's advice about treatment options, the court stated that
the "patient must know whether the advice is influenced by
self-serving financial considerations created by the health insurance provider."7 4
The Seventh Circuit took the Eighth Circuit's decision in
75
Shea one step further in Herdrich v. Pegram.
In Herdrich,
the court held that financial incentive schemes may constitute
a breach of fiduciary duty when plan physicians and administrators delay or withhold necessary treatment or proper care to
beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses7 6
The court noted that the mere existence of a bonus incentive
scheme in a managed care setting does not automatically give

72. See id. at 629. In reaching this decision, the court first rejected the
HMO's claim that a decedent whose estate claims breach of fiduciary duty is
not a current plan participant and therefore lacks standing to sue. See id. at
628. The court recognized an exception to ERISA's provision authorizing only
"current" plan participants to assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, reasoning that any other result would unfairly reward the HMO. See il
73. See id. at 628-29. In particular, silence about financial incentives is
harmful if it keeps a patient from making an informed decision about whether
to trust her doctor's recommendation that a referral is unnecessary, as was
the case in Shea. See id. at 629.
74- Id at 628.
75. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998). Ms. Herdrich brought suit after her
lIMO delayed diagnosing a mass in her abdomen as appendicitis, causing her
appendix to rupture, deteriorate, and inflict her with peritonitis, a lifethreatening illness. See id. at 374. Ms. Herdrich's doctor insisted that she
wait eight days to obtain an ultrasound because her employer-sponsored
HMO required plan participants to receive medical care from plan-staffed facilities. See id. After Ms. Herdrich's appendix ruptured, her HMO continued
to defray costs, insisting that she have the surgery to drain and cleanse her
ruptured appendix at a plan facility. See id.
76. See id. at 373. Herdrich has significant implications for physicianowned health care plans, since the defendant Carle and its subsidiaries were
owned and operated by physicians. See id. at 370. Physicians managed the
health plan, including the doctor referral process, the nature and duration of
patient treatment, and the extent to which participants were required to use
Carle-owned facilities. See id. The court also noted that physicians were in
control of year-end bonuses administered to plan administrators. See id. As a
result of this authority, the court held that Carle's physician-owners fit the
statutory definition of fiduciaries and thus were subject to ERISA's mandate.
See id. at 369-71.
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rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.77 However, when a plaintiff
alleges that a managed care entity used an incentive system to
benefit plan physicians and administrators to the detriment of
patients, the plaintiff has presented sufficient information for a
trial on the merits.78
As these cases demonstrate, it is possible to interpret
ERISA so that HMOs are not completely shielded from liability. However, Shea and Herdrich do not offer sufficient guidance for lower courts deciding cases with similar issues. 9 In
particular, the scope of fiduciary duties owed by a plan physician or administrator and what factual circumstances must be
present before the MCO will be held liable for breaching those
duties are unclear.80 Moreover, even if a plaintiff is successful
on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, she is still left with the
limited remedies provided by ERISA.
B. STATE LAWS SUBJECT MANAGED CARE ENTITIES TO
LLABIUTY

State legislatures have also attempted to hold MCOs accountable by proposing and enacting laws that subject them to
liability for wrongful treatment decisions. In early 1997, Texas
became the first state to enact a law subjecting MCOs to liability for unreasonably granting or denying medical treatment
to patients.8 ' Many state legislatures are following Texas's
77. See id. at 373.
78. See i4c at 380. Throughout its lengthy decision, the court subtly attacked managed care, stating at one point that "[mledical care should not be
subject to the whim of the new layer of insurance bureaucracy now dictating
the most basic, as well as the important, medical policies and procedures from
the boardroom." Id. at 377.
79. See Johnson, supra note 22, at 1634 (arguing that the Shea court's
opinion fails to provide courts or commentators with significant guidance);
Barbara Yuill, Seventh CircuitAllows Patient to Sue Alleging ERISA Breach
of FiduciaryDuty, Health L. Rep. (BNA), at 1349 (Aug. 27, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-HLR File (presenting the views of various health law practitioners as to the ambiguities surrounding the Herdrichdecision).
80. In both Shea and Herdrich, the courts held that the district courts
erred in dismissing the injured plaintiffs claim that the defendant-HIMO
breached its ERISA fiduciary duties. However, neither court set forth a rule
or test that defined what events must be present for a breach of fiduciary duty
to be found. Therefore, it appears that the scope of an HMO's fiduciary duties
and what constitutes a breach of those duties will be determined on a case-bycase basis.
81. See TEL Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 88.001-88.003 (West Supp.
1998). The law requires health insurance carriers, health maintenance organizations, or other managed care entities to exercise ordinary care when
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lead. For example, late in 1997, Missouri legislators passed a
managed care law82 that adds HMOs to the definition of health
care provider and subjects them to liability for making negligent medical decisions.8 3 Lawmakers in Arizona, California,
Georgia, New York, and New Jersey have proposed similar
legislation.84 New York's managed care law also gives customers the right to ask for an independent review if they believe
their claims for service were wrongly denied.85 This permits
patients to challenge treatment decisions made by MCOs without litigation and the threat of ERISA preemption.
Although these laws protect patients in theory, whether
patients will be able to take advantage of the legislation remains uncertain, because the health care industry is arguing
that ERISA preempts the statutes. For example, before the
Texas law took effect, Aetna Health Plans of Texas and related
companies sued to overturn the law as it applies to employee
benefit plans on the grounds that it violates ERISA.86 The
Texas law withstood the challenge at the district court level in
CorporateHealth Insurance,Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance. 87 The CorporateHealth court upheld sections of the new
Texas law after a lengthy analysis of cases and commentary on
ERISA preemption. 88 If the ruling survives appeal, Texas
making health care treatment decisions, and holds these entities liable for any
harm resulting from their failure to exercise ordinary care. See id. § 88.002.
The law also requires patients' negligence claims to undergo independent review prior to suit, thus paralleling notice procedures for medical malpractice
suits against physicians under Texas law. See William M. Sage, Enterprise
Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 178 (1997).
82 See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 538.205-538.30 (West 1997).
83. See id. § 538.205(4). The Missouri law has been described as one of
the nation's toughest and most comprehensive managed care laws. See John
G. Carlton, FederalLaw ProtectingManaged Care Comes Under Fire:HMOs
Receive "Shield of Immunity" from Lawsuits, ST. Louis POST DISPATcH, Aug.
30, 1998, at Al.
"4 See Wayne J. Guglielmo, Sharp Shootin": Texas Doctors Put HMOs in
the MalpracticeTargetZone, MED. ECON., Dec. 22, 1997, at 88, 97.
85. See S. 7838, 221st Leg. (N.Y. 1997). By July 1, 1999, HMOs in New
York must establish a process for such appeals. See Tony Fong, HMO Patients Get a Chance to Appeal: A New State Law Allows Patients to Put a Disputed Decision in the Hands of an Independent Review Panel, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse), Sept. 17, 1998, at B9. The law also makes it easier for patients
suffering from life-threatening conditions to seek coverage for treatments considered experimental. See id.
86. See Guglielmo, supra note 84, at 98.
87. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
8& See id. at 629. In reaching this conclusion, the court first determined
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health plan members will have a right to sue for damages
when their health plan, a plan employee, or a plan agent fails
89
to exercise ordinary care.
Although the Texas statute withstood the ERISA challenge at the district court level, 90 it is very possible that other
states will not be as successful, resulting in state-to-state inconsistencies and ambiguities over the rights of patients and
the obligations of MCOs. Patients and HMOs might even consider moving to states where the health care law is most favorable to them, creating economic and employment issues that
many states will not be able to handle.
The efforts of federal courts and state legislatures to hold
HMOs accountable are commendable but ineffective means of
overcoming the barriers of ERISA preemption. Rather than
searching for ways to make the current law work for patients
denied proper treatment, the government must pass a new law
that gives patients the right to sue MCOs for wrongful treatment decisions. Congress can best guarantee patients this protection by amending ERISA.
C. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS FOR HEALTH CARE
REFORM

In 1997 Congress debated two bills, the Managed Care
Plan Accountability Act (MCPAA)91 and the Patient Access to

whether the Texas law made reference to ERISA health plans, since the Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a State's law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans... or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation... that 'reference' will result in pre-emption." Id
at 612 (quoting California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). The court found that the Texas law
affects Texas health insurance carriers, HMOs, and other managed care entities without immediately and exclusively concerning ERISA plans. See id at
614. Therefore, the court concluded that the law was safe from preemption on
this factor. See id. Furthermore, the court found that the law covers the
quality of care actually delivered, not the withholding of benefits. See id at
620. Agreeing with the Third Circuit's analysis in Dukes v. U.S. HealthCare,
57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), that claims challenging the quality of a benefit are
not preempted by ERISA, the Texas court concluded that a claim brought under the new law concerning the quality of a benefit will remain valid. See id
at 629.
89. See Allison Bell, Texas Members Can Sue HMOs, Court Rules, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH, Sept. 28, 1998, available in 1998 WL
20199224.
90. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
91. H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Responsible Care Act (PARCA).92 MCPAA was proposed to
amend ERISA's civil enforcement provision. 93 It would have
allowed an ERISA plan participant to sue her MCO in federal
court for damages if she proved that she was wrongfully denied
benefits as a result of a cost containment technique. 94 Furthermore, the MCPAA would have required managed care
plans to indemnify physicians for liability resulting from the
failure to provide a benefit as a direct result of plan restrictions
on doctor-patient communications. 95 PARCA, in contrast,
would have made ERISA's preemption provision inapplicable
to any state cause of action brought against a health plan or
insurer to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful
death.96 Neither PARCA nor the MCPAA survived the 1997
legislative session.
Prompted by PARCA's sweeping proposal to permit patients to sue for damages against HMOs that deny treatment,
Democratic Congressman John Dingell and Senator Edward
Kennedy introduced their own bill, the Patients' Bill of Rights,

92. S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997).
93. See H.R. 1749 § 2(a).
94. See id. Democratic Congressmen Pete Stark and George Miller introduced the Managed Care Plan Accountability Act (MCPAA) with the belief
that it would close the "loophole" in ERISA that HMOs use to avoid liability in
court. See Bill Would Allow Patients to Sue Plans, AM. POL. NETWORIK May
23, 1997, at 3. Stark and Miller hoped that the Act would help make sense of
the legal confusion over ERISA by giving patients the right to sue HMOs in
federal court for compensatory as well as punitive damages. See id.
Because the MCPAA permitted patients to sue for damages in federal
court, it attracted its share of critics and supporters. Expressing opposition to
the proposed legislation, representatives from the American Association of
Health Plans argued that "[t]he Stark bill, and the free-for-all legal expenses
that would accompany its passage, would work an extraordinary hardship on
the ability of employer-sponsored health plans to continue providing low-cost,
high-quality health care." Id. In contrast, the Consumers Union applauded
the bill's introduction, statingWhen managed care companies put profits ahead of patient care,
when they use their power to overturn medical professionals' decisions and deny care, they use ERISA as a shield.... This is anticonsumer, unfair and unconscionable.... It is time that Congress answers the question whether managed care plans be allowed to evade
responsibility for their actions with a resounding no.
Id.
95. See Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking MalpracticeLiability and ERISA
Preemption in the Age of Managed Care, 9 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 433, 449
(1998). MCPAA also would have imposed adverse tax consequences on plans
committing statutory violations. See id.
96. See S. 644 § 4; H.R. 1415 § 4.
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in March of 1998. 97 This legislation was characterized as the
"most sweeping of the HMO bills on the agenda,"98 and it attracted its share of proponents and opponents.99 Republican
Congressmen introduced similar legislation in July,100 but both
the House and Senate proposals lacked many of the protections
offered by the Kennedy-Dingell plan.
Congressional Republicans and Democrats differ on how to
accomplish managed care reform, as was demonstrated by
their proposals for the Patients' Bill of Rights legislation. The
Kennedy-Dingell plan proposed that ERISA be amended to enable patients to hold health plans accountable for harmful
treatment decisions. The proposal provided internal 01 and ex97. S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3605, 105th Cong. (1998).
98. Jonathan Cohn, Cosmetic Surgery, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 17, 1998, at
21.
99. One firm supporter of the Democrats' proposal was President Clinton.
He promised to veto any managed care bill that was not "a real Patients' Bill
of Rights," urging that the United States needs "a bill of rights, not a bill of
goods." Clinton Threatens to Veto RepublicanBills, Sets Tests for "Real Patients' Bill of Rights", Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d5 (Aug. 11, 1998),
availablein WESTLAW, BNA-HCD File. By "real," President Clinton meant
a bill that provides the essential protections offered by the Democrats' proposal for the "Patients' Bill of Rights." See infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing the protections offered by the Democrats' proposal).
100. See S. 2330, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998). Republican senators named their legislation the "Patients' Bill of Rights Act."
House Republicans entitled their proposal the "Patient Protection Act."
101. The provision governing internal appeals of adverse treatment decisions permitted a patient enrolled in an HMO to appeal treatment decisions to
"a physician or other health care professional (or professionals) who has been
selected by the plan or issuer and who has not been involved in the appealable
decision at issue in the appeal." H.R. 3605 § 132(b)(2)(A); S. 1890 §
132(b)(2)(A). Appealable treatment decisions include any of the following.
(A) Denial, reduction, or termination of, or failure to provide or
make payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit, including a failure
to cover an item or service for which benefits are otherwise provided
because it is determined to be experimental or investigational or not
medically necessary or appropriate.
(B) Failure to provide coverage of emergency services or reimbursement of maintenance care or post-stabilization care.
(C) Failure to provide a choice of provider.
(D) Failure to provide qualified health care providers.
(E)Failure to provide access to specialty and other care.
(F) Failure to provide continuation of care.
(G) Failure to provide coverage of routine patient costs in connection with an approval clinical trial.
(H) Failure to provide access to needed drugs.
(I) Discrimination in delivery of services.
(J)An adverse determination under a utilization review pro-
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ternal 02 processes for patients to appeal adverse determinations by their MCOs. The internal review process permitted a
patient enrolled in an MCO to appeal various enumerated
treatment decisions to a physician or other health care professional selected by the health plan. 103 The external review procedure provided patients with the ability to appeal a treatment
decision before a board of medical and legal professionals outside of the MCO's administration. 104 In addition to these review mechanisms, the Kennedy-Dingell proposal granted patients the right to sue MCOs for denying them medically
necessary treatment. 05 Moreover, the proposal allowed physicians, rather than MCOs, to determine whether a treatment is
"medically necessary."'106 Neither Republican proposal permitted patients to sue their MCOs.107 However, if an MCO denies
treatment to a patient in a life-threatening situation, the
gram.
(K) The imposition of a limitation [on the provision of services].
H.R. 3605 § 132(a)(2)(A)-(K); S. 1890 § 132(a)(2)(A)-(KI.
102. The provision governing external appeals permitted a patient enrolled
in an HMO to appeal an "externally appealable decision" to a review board
meeting the following requirements:
(A) There is no real or apparent conflict of interest that would
impede the entity conducting external appeal activities independent
of the plan or issuer.
(B) The entity conducts external appeal activities through clinical peers.
(C) The entity has sufficient medical, legal, and other expertise
and sufficient staffing to conduct external appeal activities for the
plan or issue on a timely basis.
(D) The entity meets such other requirements as the appropriate
Secretary may impose.
H.R. 3605 § 133(c)(1)(A)-(D); S. 1890 § 133(c)(1)(A)-(D). An "externally appealable decision" means an appealable decision as defined in section 132(a)(2)
if:
(A) the amount involved exceeds a significant threshold; or
(B) the patient's life or health is jeopardized as a consequence of
the decision.
H.R. 3605 § 133(a)(2)(A)-(B); S. 1890 § 133(a)(2)(A)-(B).
103. See supra note 101.
104. See supra note 102.
105. See H.R. 3605 § 133(d); S. 1890 § 133(d).
106. See H.R. 3605 § 151(c); S. 1890 § 151(c); see also David Nather, Medical Necessity Proposal Poses Threat to Managed Care, Health Executives
Warn, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d4 (Sept. 2, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-HCD File (introducing the medical necessity provision of
the Kennedy-Dingell proposal for the Patients' Bill of Rights and discussing
arguments in support of and in opposition to the provision).
107. See Jonathan Cohn, Mangling Care, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1998, at
15.
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House GOP plan permitted the patient to have another doctor
within the plan consider the case within three days.10 8 If that
internal reviewer did not agree with the patient, the proposal
provided that a doctor outside the plan could make an independent recommendation.109
By the end of September, it became clear that the debate
over the Patients' Bill of Rights legislation had developed into
a political battle as Democrats tried to attach their proposal to
a series of other bills and Republicans resisted.1 10 These political conflicts inhibited the passing of the Patients' Bill of Rights
legislation, but did not kill the health care reform issue. Both
Republicans and Democrats expect the reform proposals to be
an issue in next year's legislative session.'
In spite of the death of the Patients' Bill of Rights, the
need for legislation that removes the threat of ERISA preemption remains significant. Congressional Democrats demand
that prospective health care legislation contain powerful protections for patients. Congressional Republicans assert that
such legislation must not disrupt the cost containment purpose
of managed care. Future health care reform must address both
of these positions, balancing the needs of patients with the objectives of today's health care industry.

108. See H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. § 1201 (1998).
109. See id. The Kennedy-Dingell plan had an appeals mechanism nearly
identical to the Republican proposal. See supra notes 101-02. However, unlike the GOP plan, which permitted an insurance company to charge a patient
up to $100 per review, the Kennedy-Dingell plan provided for free appeals to
an outside doctor. See Cohn, supra note 107, at 15. Furthermore, the Kennedy-Dingell bill made external appeals binding by imposing an automatic
fine on MCOs that failed to follow the decision of the review board. See id.
The GOP bill, in contrast, required the patient to go to court to impose the
fine. See id. at 15-16.
110. See Chafee Puts off Managed Care ProposalUntil Next Year As Deadlock Dragson, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA), at d6 (Sept. 25, 1998), available
in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD File.
11L See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing plans to include
the health care reform issue in next year's political agenda).
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M. HEALTH CARE REFORM LEGISLATION:
AMENDING ERISA TO PROVIDE PATIENTS WITH
A FEDERAL REMEDY AGAINST MCOS THAT DENY OR
RESTRICT TREATMENT
Congress should amend ERISA to provide patients with
the right to sue MCOs in federal court 12 for damages caused by
wrongful treatment decisions. Prior to litigation, a board of
impartial physicians should review a patient's complaint to determine whether the patient should have been provided with
the medical treatment denied by the MCO. In amending
ERISA, Congress must consider the social and economic implications of providing patients with this powerful right, and in
particular, the effects the right will have on the cost-cutting
purpose of managed care.
A. THE BENEFITS OF GRANTING PATIENTS THE RIGHT TO SUE
The ERISA amendment will have numerous positive effects if it permits patients to sue MCOs for wrongful treatment
decisions. First, the amendment will benefit patients by eliminating the shield of immunity that ERISA has provided for
MCOs.113 This will ensure that ERISA's purpose of promoting

the interest of individuals enrolled in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries will apply to the health care industry. 14
In particular, amending ERISA to provide patients with
the opportunity to hold MCOs liable in federal court would
adapt ERISA to the changing realities of modern health care.
When ERISA was passed in 1974, managed care was in its infancy, and doctors provided abundant service and treatment to
patients at a high cost to employers. 115 As more employers re112. A federal cause of action ensures that ERISA's purpose of protecting
employers from conflicting state regulation of employee benefit plans is maintained. For further discussion of the benefits of amending ERISA to create a
uniform federal cause of action for patients, see infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
113. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.
Mass. 1997) (arguing that there is a "glaring need for Congress to amend
ERISA" to stop the evolution of ERISA as a "shield of immunity that protects
health insurers, utilization review providers, and other managed care entities
from potential liability").
114 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (noting that Congress's
primary objective in enacting ERISA was to protect employee-participants
and their beneficiaries from the abuses occurring in employee benefit plans).
115. See Ayling, supra note 61, at 405; see also supra note 22 (discussing
the fee-for-service form of health insurance prevalent at the time of ERISA's
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alized the cost benefits of managed care, membership in MCOs
exploded, but physicians and MCOs began to abuse the cost
containment features of managed care health plans to the detriment of employee beneficiaries. 16 Although ERISA's text and
legislative history indicate that Congress enacted ERISA to
preempt state law causes of action that relate to employee
benefit plans, Congress's main purpose in enacting ERISA was
to safeguard the interests of employees. 117 Because ERISA has
been used to regulate health care benefits in a way that jeopardizes the interest of employees in obtaining quality health
care, ERISA is harming employees rather than protecting
them.118 Therefore, for Congress to stay true to its intentions,
it must amend ERISA to keep the statute's purpose in line
with modem health care.
In addition to protecting patients, ERISA reform legislation will benefit the states and the federal judiciary by providing a uniform statute under which all patients could hold
MCOs accountable for denying them treatment. As more and
more states pass laws permitting patients to sue MCOs,
ERISA's purpose of ensuring that employees are subject to a
uniform body of benefits law 19 arguably will be defeated, because an MCO may cover employees in various states and thus
be confronted with conflicting statutes. Permitting patients to
sue under state common law claims also defeats this purpose,
since the elements of malpractice, wrongful death, and breach
of contract claims may differ among the states. 120 In order to
enactment).
116. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text (referring to the rise of
managed care and the negative effects the system has had on patients).
117. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes behind Congress's decision to enact ERISA in 1974).
118. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the abuses suffered by some patients enrolled in managed care health plans).
119. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (stating that one of the purposes
of ERISA's preemption clause is "to ensure that [employee benefit] plans and
plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law").
120. The major problem with ERISA preemption of patient claims against
MCOs is that patients do not have sufficient means of targeting wrongful
treatment denials or restrictions by MCOs. The proposed amendment eliminates this difficulty by granting patients a uniform federal cause of action
against MCOs to challenge such decisions. If patients are injured purely as a
result of their physicians' negligence, the proposed amendment does not hamper their ability to bring state claims against their physicians. However, the
amendment continues to preempt such claims if they are brought against
MCOs under the doctrine of vicarious liability. This ensures that MCOs will
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eliminate this problem, Congress must amend ERISA to state
explicitly that the Act preempts patient claims brought under
state common law causes of action and statutes like the Texas
and Missouri managed care laws. 12 1 As a result, states will no
longer have the burden of enacting legislation that permits patients to sue because the amendment would provide a uniform
cause of action for all patients in all states. Moreover, federal
courts will no longer need to engage in the difficult task of interpreting ERISA's ambiguous preemptive language 122 and determining the scope of the fiduciary obligations imposed by
ERISA on MCOs.123
Congress will also benefit the health care industry by enacting ERISA reform legislation. Currently, due to ERISA
preemption, patients denied treatment may only be able to sue
and collect damages by bringing state causes of action against
their treating physicians and hospitals.124 This places an
enormous amount of pressure on physicians affiliated with
managed care entities, because many MCOs encourage physicians to place financial considerations ahead of their duty to
provide quality health care to patients, increasing the probability of negligent treatment outcomes.125 An ERISA amendnot be subject to conflicting state common law, thus accomplishing one of
ERISA's purposes. In addition, it limits the risk that patients will target
MCOs' "deep pockets" for physicians' actions that have no relation to decisions
made according to plan policy or administration, a situation that would likely
force MCOs to raise insurance premiums.
121- See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). By specifically preempting state
claims, the ERISA amendment would save courts from the arduous task of
determining whether a patient's claims are preempted by BRISA because they
"relate to [an] employee benefit plan." Id
123. Although federal courts have recognized that ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations on HMOs, thus permitting patients to bring suit in federal
court against HMOs for breach of these obligations, the courts have not yet
determined the scope of these duties and the proof that a patient must present to show that the HMO has breached its duties. See supra notes 12, 70-78
and accompanying text (discussing federal cases exploring HMOs' fiduciary
obligations under ERISA).
124. Although some patients have managed to collect damages from HMOs
by bringing vicarious liability claims against them, these claims are not always successful. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Since ERISA
preemption does not prevent patients from bringing medical malpractice,
wrongful death and other state law claims against their treating physicians,
patients are most certain to collect damages by bringing suits against them.
See supranote 63.
125. See supra notes 24-28 (discussing the financial pressures faced by
physicians contracting with HMOs).
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ment that permits patients to sue MCOs would help eliminate
some of this strain by encouraging patients to target the actions and decisions of their MCOs when they have been denied
adequate care.

B. THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Although permitting patients to sue MCOs in federal court
for damages carries numerous benefits, critics including House
and Senate Republicans argue that this right is the ticket to
increased health insurance premiums.1 26 The critics assert
that the purpose of MCOs is to reduce the costs of health care,
and any legislation that encourages patients to bring lawsuits
against MCOs would motivate them to raise insurance premiums at a substantial rate. 127 The obvious negative effect of a
substantial increase in health care costs is that many Americans will be forced to go without health insurance because they
and their employers cannot afford the premiums. In response
to these concerns, lobbyists, consumer protection groups, and
Congressional offices have commissioned studies to determine
whether and to what extent ERISA reform would actually lead
to increased insurance premiums. 128 Because these studies
have produced inconsistent, inconclusive results, 129 the likelihood of an increase in premiums remains uncertain.
126. One critic fears that regulating managed care by giving patients the
right to sue will result in either of two consequences: (1) insurance will become too expensive for many people; or (2) the insurance companies will cut
their costs by insuring only healthier people. See Cohn, supra note 98, at 22.
127. See id.
128. Acting on its belief that ERISA reform will hamper MCOs' ability to
control costs, the insurance industry and its lobby commissioned studies that
showed such reform would produce an increase in health care premiums
ranging from 3 to 23%. See id. at 21. This range of increase would make
health insurance too expensive for millions of Americans, especially those employed by small businesses. See id Insurance lobbyists and Republicans have
latched onto these figures, casting themselves not as opponents of reform but
as protectors of the needy. See id.
The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducted its own
study, finding that even the sweeping proposals of the Democrats' Patients'
Bill of Rights would only cause a modest premium hike of approximately 4%.
In particular, the CBO found that each ERISA reform provision would individually produce a premium hike of 1.4%. See id.
129. See Litvan, supra note 17, at Al (acknowledging that various political
groups have come up with widely different cost estimates for health care reform proposals). These inconsistent results and the political struggles between those commissioning the studies make it difficult to know which studies
are reliable.
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Insurance lobbyists and Republicans assume that granting
patients the right to sue MCOs will automatically increase litigation and thus force MCOs to increase premiums. 130 It is very
possible, however, that granting patients the right to sue will
decrease litigation by deterring MCOs from wrongfully denying
or restricting a patient's medical treatment. 131 This result has
actually occurred in states with statutes granting patients the
right to sue MCOs. In Texas, for example, no lawsuits have
been filed against HMOs since the law allowing patients to sue
their HMOs was passed in 1997,132 leading some to conclude
that the law has actually diverted lawsuits and saved patients'
legal costs. 133 Moreover, Congress can decrease the financial
threat of increased litigation by restricting the damages injured patients can collect in the ERISA amendment. 134
Because ERISA reform will likely benefit patients, federal
courts, the health care industry, and the states,135 Congress
should amend ERISA despite the uncertain, politically charged
speculation that premiums might increase. The Democrats'
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. This has been one of the arguments made in response to concerns that
exposing MCOs to vicarious liability for the malpractice of plan physicians
will lead to increased premiums. See Natalie Zellner, Note & Comment, Duking it out: Beating the Complete Preemption of ERISA Under Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 948-49 (1998). Those in support of
exposing MCOs to malpractice liability argue that it will deter MCOs from
hiring incompetent physicians and will encourage them to heighten the standard of care used in making medical decisions. See id.; see also Helene L.
Parise, Comment, The Proper Extension of Tort Liability Principles in the
Managed Care Industry, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 977, 1004-05 (1991). As a result,
the quality of healthcare delivered by MCOs and physicians will increase, and
the threat of costly malpractice claims will decrease. See Zellner, supra, at
949; see also Seema R. Shah, Comment, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip
on HMO Medical MalpracticeClaims:A Response to Pacificare of Oklahoma v.
Burrage, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1575 (1996).
131 See Randolph D. Smoak, Jr., AMA Pushing Congress to Get it Right on
Patients'Rights,AM. MED. NEws, Sept. 7, 1998, at 21.
133. See id.
134. Congress could limit the financial implications of granting patients
the right to sue MCOs in a variety of ways. The ERISA amendment might
provide that a patient can only collect punitive damages when the patient
demonstrates that the MCO willfully or recklessly denied or restricted medical treatment. In addition, the amendment could place caps on the amount of
punitive damages based on the size of the MCO. The amendment might also
state that MCOs are entitled to collect attorney's fees and costs if they show
that the patient's claim is frivolous or unreasonable.
135. See supra Part HIA (discussing the positive implications of an ERISA
amendment that grants patients the right to sue MCOs in federal court for
damages).
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proposal for the Patients' Bill of Rights appears to recognize
this by granting patients the right to sue in spite of the financial risks.136 On this point, the Democrats' legislation offers patients greater protection than that proposed by Congressional
Republicans.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF PRE-TRIAL REVIEW AS A
PREREQUISITE TO SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT
In amending ERISA to permit patients to sue MCOs in
federal court for damages, Congress should provide safeguards
to ensure that patients do not abuse this newfound right. In
addition to the threat of increased insurance premiums, permitting patients to sue MCOs creates the possibility that patients will bring lawsuits without considering whether the
MCO was truly unreasonable or negligent in denying treatment. Due to the time and money that must be spent to litigate cases, the ERISA amendment should provide that patients may sue only after they have exhausted other means of
obtaining the treatment they desire.
A. A mANDATORY APPEALS PROCESS AS A PREREQUISITE TO
BRINGING SUIT
Congress can best ensure that patients bringing suit were
unreasonably denied care and that their MCOs were responsible for the resulting consequences by incorporating a mandatory administrative review procedure into the ERISA amendment. An external appeals process is one mechanism that
effectively achieves this purpose. The process would occur as
follows: after an MCO denies a patient coverage for treatment
that the patient and her physician agreed was in her best
medical interest, the patient would appeal the decision to an
external review board paid for by the MCO. The board would
be comprised of medical, legal, and other professionals who
have the expertise and staffing necessary to administer a review hearing. Potential members include physicians in the
specialty relevant to the treatment decision, health administrators not affiliated with the patient's MCO, and persons familiar with the financial and legal aspects of health care administration.

136. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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In determining whether the patient-claimant was unreasonably denied treatment by the MCO, the board would first
evaluate the patient's condition and the reasons her treating
physician believed the treatment was in her best interest. The
board would then consider the cost of the proposed treatment
and the availability of similarly effective, more cost-efficient alternatives, but only after the members have a complete understanding of the medical aspects of the patient's situation. Once
this analysis is complete, the board members would vote on
whether to uphold or reverse the MCO's decision, and the
treating physician and MCO would be subject to the board's
judgment. The time allotted for the committee to conduct this
process would be correlated with the severity of the patient's
condition. The board must be prepared to conduct a hastened
review where the patient's condition is so severe that the time
taken for normal review would jeopardize the life or health of
the patient. If the board is unable to perform a hastened review of the emergency situation, the MCO must permit the patient's physician to make the final treatment decision.
B. BRINGING THE CLAIM TO FEDERAL COuRT
If the board upholds the MCO's treatment decision, the patient has two options: she can rest her case and accept the
treatment the MCO is willing to provide, or she can challenge
the decision by filing suit in federal district court. The ERISA
amendment should allow patients choosing litigation to elect a
jury trial. At trial, the findings of the review board would be
probative but not binding. This enables the factfnder to examine the substance of the patient's claim without presuming
that the MCO and review board acted reasonably. Because review board members are not elected but are chosen by MCO
representatives and patient advocates, it is possible that their
decisions will not be as impartial as they are supposed to be. A
trial on the merits will enable the district court to check for
evidence of corruption and to overturn decisions reflecting such
bias.
C. ADVANTAGES OF A LIMITED RIGHT TO SUE

Incorporating a mandatory pre-trial review process into
the ERISA amendment presents numerous advantages. First,
the process eliminates frivolous treatment denials and restrictions by having impartial medical and health care professionals make final treatment decisions. By reducing the role of
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MOO administrators, the process gives MCOs much less incentive and opportunity to put financial considerations before patients' well-being. It also motivates MCOs to exercise greater
caution when initially granting or denying treatment so that
the patient will not challenge the treatment decision, thus
saving the MCO the cost of paying for both the desired treatment and an appeal to the review board.
Second, the mandatory review process benefits MCOs by
providing them with valuable evidence in their favor if dissatisfied patients challenge adverse treatment decisions in court.
If review board members agree with an MCO's treatment decision, the MCO can rely upon their testimony to support its
case. Although the district court is not bound by the findings
of the review board, these findings will likely educate the court
about the circumstances of the patient's case. The court may
even defer to the judgment of these medical and health care
experts in cases where there is no evidence of bias or corruption. Third, assuming the board is competent and independent, it may be difficult for the patient-plaintiff to find an array
of witnesses that will sufficiently undermine the review board's
expertise. For these reasons, MCOs will be motivated to make
sound, medically-supported treatment decisions that will survive appeal.
Critics argue that taking from MCOs the final authority to
determine whether treatment should be administered will
eliminate their ability to control health care costs. 137 This assertion should not be a concern with the body of impartial professionals suggested above.1 38 By establishing a committee of
unbiased medical and health care experts to review treatment
denials, the ERISA amendment would assure MCOs that people who are involved with managed care are part of the decisionmaking process. Moreover, whether affiliated with an

137. See Nather, supra note 106.
138. Health insurance and business lobbyists, as well as House and Senate
Republicans, are the major actors who oppose permitting physicians, rather
than plan administrators, to determine whether treatment is a medical necessity. See id. They believe that the medical necessity provision "could force
health plans to cover virtually any service a physician wants to provide, regardless of whether there is any scientific evidence that it is the right treatment for the patient's condition." Id. They also argue that the medical necessity provision would hurt managed care's ability to increase the use of
preventive services "because physicians would see no reason to discuss treatments with the health plan and 'would talk about a cure to the exclusion of
prevention.' Id.
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MCO or not, today's medical professionals know that authorizing physicians to administer unnecessary medical treatment
leads to financial crises that ultimately hurt patients.'3 9
Therefore, review board members will likely use great care in
exercising their power to determine whether to uphold a
treatment decision in order to ensure that employers will be financially able to provide health care benefits for their employees into the future.
Commentators have also questioned the efficacy of external appeals processes because they are paid for by MCOs,
which gives them an element of control that will ultimately
leave patients where they would have been without the appeals
process. For example, in the Medicare context, studies show
that more than half of MCOs do not fully comply with the federal rules for grievance procedures. 140 In particular, MCOs often mishandle appeals from the denial of treatment or reimbursement as grievances about quality or other matters,
denying enrollees access to external review.' 4 ' Even if MCOs
comply with these rules, some critics question whether MCOs
will inform beneficiaries about their right to make a complaint
to an external review board about treatment denials.142 They
also argue that most beneficiaries will not understand the
kinds of denials that trigger their appeal rights or have sufficient knowledge to exercise their rights effectively.43
These criticisms fail to recognize the positive influence
that the mandatory review process will have on MCOs. Requiring MCOs to fund review board appeals will encourage
MCOs to make better treatment decisions to avoid the cost of
the appeal and future litigation costs. 1 " MCOs will realize
that sound medical decisions are much more cost-effective than
mishandling a patient's appeal. In addition, although MCOs
will fund review board appeals, the amount of control that the
139. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing the cost containment aspects of managed care and their effects on today's physicians).
140. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICARE HMO APPEAL AND GRIEVANCE PROCESSES
(1996). In particular, the report found that 66% of HMOs distributed information about appeal and grievance rights that was either incorrect or incom-

plete.

141. See id.
142. See Tracy E. Miller, Center Stage on the PatientProtectionAgenda:
Grievanceand Appeal Rights, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 90 (1998).
143. See id.
144. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.

19991

ERISA AMENDMENT

1059

ERISA amendment will permit the MCO to have over the appeal is minimal. First, medical and health care professionals
will not be chosen for the review board if they have a conflict of
interest with the patient or her MCO. Second, an unfavorable
decision at the review level can always be challenged in court,
and the court, after hearing evidence presented by the patient
and the MCO, can determine whether the MCO exerted undue
control over the review process. Third, the ERISA amendment
could provide patients with a statutory remedy (e.g., attorney's
fees and costs, liquidated damages, or punitive damages) if
they show that the MCOs acted inappropriately in providing
their appeal.
As far as informing patients of their right to appeal and
helping them understand when they can bring the appeal, responsibility should lie with treating physicians. Treating physicians have just as much interest in making sure that MCOs
do not unreasonably deny treatment to patients as the patients
themselves. Therefore, they must demand that MCOs make
clear the situations in which an appeal is acceptable. They
also must educate patients about the efficacy of bringing an
appeal based on their medical conditions, and about the steps
they must take to accomplish effective appeals. Furthermore,
Congress could aid physicians by dictating in the ERISA
amendment the form of disclosure that should be made to patients. By building these safeguards into the ERISA amendment, Congress can ensure that patients are protected while
maintaining a balance of authority between patients, physicians, review boards, courts, and MCOs.
CONCLUSION
As patients continue to suffer from the injustice of ERISA
preemption, the need for ERISA reform is apparent. The scope
of reform that federal courts and state legislatures can bring
about is limited. Therefore, Congress must amend ERISA to
permit patients to sue MCOs in federal court for damages. In
order to diminish the risk that this right will lead to increased
premiums and to ensure that the MCO truly acted unreasonably in denying treatment, a patient should not be able to exercise her right to sue until after an external review board comprised of impartial health care professionals has reviewed her
claim. This arrangement enables medically-trained professionals to protect patients without the pressure of financial in-

1060

MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 83:1027

centives while ensuring that the cost-cutting purpose of managed care is not destroyed by unnecessary litigation.

